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Social cognition is fundamentally interpersonal: individuals’ behavior and dispositions
critically affect their interaction partners’ information processing. However, cognitive
neuroscience studies, partially because of methodological constraints, have remained
largely “perceiver-centric”: focusing on the abilities, motivations, and goals of social
perceivers while largely ignoring interpersonal effects. Here, we address this knowledge
gap by examining the neural bases of perceiving emotionally expressive and inexpressive
social “targets.” Sixteen perceivers were scanned using fMRI while they watched targets
discussing emotional autobiographical events. Perceivers continuously rated each target’s
emotional state or eye-gaze direction. The effects of targets’ emotional expressivity on
perceiver’s brain activity depended on task set: when perceivers explicitly attended to
targets’ emotions, expressivity predicted activity in neural structures—including medial
prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortex—associated with drawing inferences about
mental states. When perceivers instead attended to targets’ eye-gaze, target expressivity
predicted activity in regions—including somatosensory cortex, fusiform gyrus, and motor
cortex—associated with monitoring sensorimotor states and biological motion. These
findings suggest that expressive targets affect information processing in manner that
depends on perceivers’ goals. More broadly, these data provide an early step toward
understanding the neural bases of interpersonal social cognition.
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INTRODUCTION
Social life requires constant attention to and understanding of
others’ thoughts and feelings; as such, it is unsurprising that
research has increasingly focused on the neural bases of these abil-
ities (Decety, 2011; Zaki and Ochsner, 2012). The vast majority of
this work has centered around the cognitive and neural processes
engaged by perceivers (individuals focusing on another person’s
internal states) when they encounter social targets (individu-
als who are the focus of perceivers’ attention). However, social
cognition is fundamentally interpersonal, and social cognitive
outcomes (such as interpersonal accuracy and rapport) depend
just as deeply on targets’ behaviors as they do on perceivers’ skills
and motives (Zaki and Ochsner, 2011).
For example, targets vary in their levels of emotional expres-
sivity (i.e., the extent to which their behavior reflects their inter-
nal states). Expressivity can be measured either as a trait (e.g.,
through self-report questionnaires; see Gross and John, 1997) or
as a state (e.g., by coding single episodes of behaviors such as emo-
tional facial expressions; see Gross and Levenson, 1993). Trait and
state measures of expressivity are moderately correlated, such that
individuals who report themselves to be expressive also produce
more clear and intense non-verbal emotional cues in experi-
mental contexts (Gross and John, 1997; Gross et al., 2000; Zaki
et al., 2009). Perhaps more importantly, expressivity measured
as either a trait or a state predicts social outcomes. For example,
targets high in trait expressivity are interpersonally “readable,” in
that perceivers can accurately assess those targets’ internal states
(Snodgrass et al., 1998; Zaki et al., 2008; Zaki and Ochsner, 2011).
State expressivity similarly predicts interpersonal accuracy (Zaki
et al., 2009) and rapport (Butler et al., 2003).
How do targets’ expressive traits and states exert their effects
on interpersonal outcomes? Intuitively, we might expect that tar-
get attributes “get into the heads” of perceivers and affect their
processing of social information. However, such an effect could
reflect multiple mechanisms, because perceivers’ responses to
social cues depend heavily on the goals and cognitive resources
they have on hand.
When given unconstrained cognitive resources (Gilbert et al.,
1989; Epley and Waytz, 2009) and motivation to understand tar-
gets (Kunda, 1990), perceivers tend to draw explicit inferences
about internal states based on targets’ behavior and the context in
which that behavior is embedded. Such “top down” social infor-
mation processing is reliably accompanied by activity in a system
of brain regions including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC),
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), precuneus, and temporopari-
etal junction (Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; Mitchell
et al., 2002; Ochsner et al., 2004; Saxe and Powell, 2006). Critically,
inferential processing in this system is dependent on attention to
targets’ states (de Lange et al., 2008; Spunt et al., 2010; Spunt and
Lieberman, in press).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 228 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Zaki et al. Task dependent effects of target expressivity
However, perceivers do not always devote their full atten-
tion to understanding targets’ thoughts and feelings; they are
often distracted, otherwise occupied, or unmotivated to do so.
Although this prevents perceivers from engaging in “top down”
inferences, it nonetheless leaves room for a number of “bottom
up” information processing mechanisms that draw on a system
of brain regions almost wholly distinct from those accompany-
ing explicit social inference (Whalen et al., 1998). For example,
perceivers detect faces in their environment—a process drawing
on the fusiform face area (FFA; see Kanwisher et al., 1997)—and
vicariously share social targets’ sensorimotor or visceral states—a
process drawing on motor and somatosensory cortex (Rizzolatti
and Craighero, 2004; Keysers et al., 2010)—even in the absence
of explicit attention to targets’ states (Vuilleumier et al., 2001;
Winston et al., 2003; Chong et al., 2008; Spunt and Lieberman,
in press).
Differences between the characteristics and neural underpin-
nings of top down and bottom up social processing suggest
that target expressivity might affect perceivers’ information pro-
cessing, but in a manner that critically depends on task set.
Specifically, when perceivers are directly attending to targets’
internal states (e.g., emotions), expressive targets might provide
a stronger “signal” on which to base top down social inferences,
and increase perceivers’ brain activity in regions associated with
such inferences. By contrast, when perceivers are not explicitly
attending to targets’ states, expressive targets could nonetheless
produce more salient social cues (e.g., more intense emotional
facial expressions), which perceivers could evaluate using bottom
up processes instantiated in a separate set of neural structures
associated with perceiving faces or sensorimotor states.
The current study sought to test these possibilities. We pre-
sented perceivers with videos of social targets who varied in
their levels of emotional expressivity, both as assessed through
trait measures and through state ratings of their expressivity
on a video-by-video basis. As such, trait and state expressiv-
ity provided “naturalistic” variance in the intensity of social
cues produced spontaneously by social targets experiencing real
emotions, as opposed to pictures of posed expressions whose
intensity is manipulated by experimenters (Zaki and Ochsner,
2009). Perceivers viewed these targets in one of two conditions
(1) while explicitly attending to targets’ emotions, and (2) while
attending to eye-gaze, a more low level feature of target behav-
ior that is uncorrelated with the affect experienced or expressed
by targets. This allowed us to directly test the prediction that
target expressivity would modulate perceiver brain activity in a
task-dependent manner.
More broadly, this study took an explicitly interpersonal tack
toward the neural bases of social cognition. In part because of the
highly intrapersonal nature of scanner environments, extant neu-
roimaging research has been almost entirely “perceiver-centric”:
focusing on perceivers’ skills, task sets, and motivations as deter-
minants of judgment and predictors of neural activity. However,
both intuition and behavioral research clearly support a more
nuanced view of social information processing, in which per-
ceivers’ abilities and motivations interact with targets’ behaviors
and dispositions to produce interpersonal outcomes (Zayas et al.,
2002; Zaki et al., 2008; Zaki and Ochsner, 2011). By directly
examining such interactions at the level of the brain, the current
study sought to provide early steps towardmore deeply character-
izing these “interactionist” (Mischel and Shoda, 1995) features of
social cognition.
METHODS
STIMULI
More detailed descriptions of the methods used here are avail-
able elsewhere (Zaki et al., 2008, 2009). In a stimulus collection
phase of the study, targets (N = 14, 7 female, mean age = 26.5)
were videotaped while talking about affective autobiographical
memories (e.g., proposing marriage or the death of a loved one).
Eighteen videos from 11 social targets were chosen for the final
stimulus set, on the basis of their self-rated emotional intensity,
and in order to balance the number of videos of each valence and
target gender. The mean video length was 125 s (range: 72–177 s).
We examined target expressivity in two ways. First, trait
expressivity was assessed through targets’ responses to the
Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (BEQ; see Gross and John,
1997; Gross et al., 2000). This measure captures targets’ self-
concept of how expressive they are (sample item: “when I’m
happy, my feelings show”), and produced significant variance
in our sample (mean BEQ score = 4.90, range = 3.69–6.47,
SD = 1.02). In order to code “state” expressivity in each video,
we used a behavioral coding system developed by Gross and
Levenson (1993), which uses rules developed by Ekman and
Friesen (1975/2003) to assess facial signs of emotion. We focused
on the coding system’s category: “affective intensity,” because it
provides a single global measure of the strength of targets’ non-
verbal emotional displays (see Zaki et al., 2009 for more details).
Two independent coders trained in the use of this system rated the
average emotional intensity of each video, producing reliable rat-
ings (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.85; mean intensity score = 2.21, range
= 1.17–4.02, SD = 0.61). As discussed elsewhere (Zaki et al.,
2009) and found by others (Gross and John, 1997), targets’ self-
perceived trait expressivity asmeasured by the BEQwas correlated
with the intensity of their non-verbal expressive behavior on a
video by video basis, as assessed by independent raters (r = 0.28,
p < 0.005).
PROTOCOL
Perceivers (n = 16, 11 female, mean age= 19.10, SD= 1.72) were
scanned using fMRI while they watched all 18 target videos.While
watching six of these videos, perceivers continuously inferred how
positive or negative they believed targets felt at each moment;
this will be referred to as the emotion rating condition. Under
this condition, videos appeared in the center of a black screen; a
cue orienting perceivers toward their task (e.g., “how good or bad
was this person feeling?”) was presented above the video, and a
nine-point rating scale (anchored at 1 = “very negative” and 9 =
“very positive”) was presented below the video. Perceivers were
instructed to change their rating whenever they believed target’s
emotional state changed in a perceptible way. At the beginning
of each video, the number 5 was presented in bold. Whenever
perceivers pressed the left arrow key, the bolded number shifted
to the left (i.e., 5 was unbolded and 4 was bolded). When per-
ceivers pressed the right arrow key, the bolded number shifted to
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the right. In this way, perceivers could monitor their ratings in the
scanner.
While watching six other videos, perceivers were instructed to
continuously rate how far to the left or right the targets’ eye-
gaze was directed; this will be referred to as the eye-gaze rating
condition. The protocol for this condition was identical to the
emotion rating condition, except that the task cue (“where is this
person’s eye gaze directed”) and Likert scale (1 = “far left,” 9 =
“far right”) oriented perceivers toward the target’s eye gaze. This
task allowed us to examine brain activity evoked by perceivers’
attending to targets, but not explicitly focusing on targets’ internal
states1.
Perceivers viewed videos under emotion rating and eye gaze
rating in a pseudorandomized order, designed to ensure that
(1) equal numbers of positive and negative videos were viewed
by each perceiver under eye-gaze and emotion rating conditions,
(2) equal numbers of videos featuring male and female targets
were viewed by each perceiver under eye-gaze and emotion rat-
ing conditions, (3) no more than two consecutive videos were
viewed under the same task (eye gaze or emotion rating), and
(4) a roughly equal number of perceivers viewed each video
under each task condition (e.g., a given video would be viewed
by eight perceivers under the eye gaze condition, and by eight
perceivers under the emotion rating condition). Finally, six addi-
tional videos were viewed under another condition not discussed
here (see Zaki et al. (2012) for details about this condition).
IMAGING DATA ACQUISITION
Images were acquired using a 1.5 Tesla GE Twin Speed MRI scan-
ner equipped to acquire gradient-echo, echoplanar T2∗-weighted
images (EPI) with blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD)
contrast. Each volume comprised 26 axial slices of 4.5mm thick-
ness and a 3.5 × 3.5mm in-plane resolution, aligned along the
AC-PC axis. Volumes were acquired continuously every 2 s. Three
functional runs were acquired from each subject. Because stimu-
lus videos varied in length and were randomized across runs, the
length of each run varied across subjects (range = 345–406 TRs).
Each run began with five “dummy” volumes, which were dis-
carded from further analyses. At the end of the scanning ses-
sion, a T-1 weighted structural image was acquired for each
subject.
NEUROIMAGING ANALYSES
Images were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM2 (Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK), and using
custom code in Matlab 7.1 (The Mathworks, Matick, MA). All
functional volumes from each run were realigned to the first
volume of that run, spatially normalized to the standard MNI-
152 template, and smoothed using a Gaussian kernel with a full
1Eye-gaze and eye-gaze direction are, at some level, social cues (Macrae et al.,
2002; Mason et al., 2005), which, in this case, might pertain to emotions
expressed by the individuals in the video, and attending to eye-gaze can engage
some neural structures commonly associated with social inference (Calder
et al., 2002). As such, comparing emotion rating with eye-gaze rating provided
an especially conservative contrast that focused specifically on explicit atten-
tion to emotion, as opposed to incidental processing of social information (see
“Discussion”) or attentional and motoric demands.
width half maximum (FWHM) of 6mm. Mean intensity of all
volumes from each run were centered at a mean value of 100,
trimmed to remove volumes with intensity levels more than three
standard deviations from the runmean, and detrended by remov-
ing the line of best fit. After this processing, all three runs were
concatenated into one consecutive timeseries for the regression
analysis.
After preprocessing, we employed three analytic approaches
using the general linear model. Across all three approaches, videos
were modeled as blocks, in which the onset and duration of
each video was convolved with a hemodynamic function. Our
first analytic approach employed main effect contrasts to com-
pare brain activity during the emotion rating and eye-gaze rating
conditions; this served primary as a manipulation check, ensur-
ing that attention to targets’ emotion or to eye gaze preferentially
engaged regions involved in making attributions about mental
states and assessing low-level features of dynamic social stimuli
(e.g., biological motion), respectively.
The second analytic approach directly addressed our primary
hypotheses. Here, we used parametric analyses used to isolate per-
ceiver neural structures in which activity varied as a function of
target trait and state expressivity. In separate analyses, (1) tar-
gets’ BEQ scores and (2) the intensity of emotional cues in each
video were used as parametric modulators, providing regression
weights for each video block. Using this method, we searched
for clusters of activity that tracked—within perceivers—with the
expressivity of targets they were watching; that is, regions that
were more engaged when perceivers viewed a relatively expressive
target, and less engaged when they viewed a relatively inexpressive
target. These analyses were performed separately for the emotion
rating and eye-gaze rating conditions.
Finally, to more directly assess the task dependency of expres-
sivity related effects, we included two analyses aimed at isolating
differences and similarities across eye-gaze and emotion monitor-
ing. To examine differences across tasks, we computed a direct,
whole brain analysis contrasting BOLD signal related to target
expressivity (assessed at both state and trait levels) during emo-
tion rating vs. eye gaze rating, and visa versa. This allowed us
to directly assess an expressivity by task interaction in predicting
perceivers’ brain activity. To examine similarities across tasks, we
computed a conjunction including maps reflecting expressivity-
related activity in the eye-gaze rating and emotion-rating condi-
tions, using theminimum statistic approach (Nichols et al., 2005).
This analysis identifies clusters that were significantly engaged
at our threshold in not one, but both conditions. Both of these
analyses were performed separately for state and trait expressivity.
All analyses were thresholded at p < 0.005, with an extent
threshold of k = 30. This cluster size was selected to correspond
with a corrected threshold of p < 0.05, based on Monte Carlo
simulations implemented in Matlab (Slotnick et al., 2003).
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL DATA
To assess participants’ engagement during the session, we mea-
sured response rates: the number of times that perceivers changed
their ratings per minute in each of the conditions. Individuals
made significantly more ratings during the eye-gaze rating
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(mean = 14.11 ratings/minute) condition than during emotion
rating (mean = 9.83 ratings/minute) condition, t(15) = 3.17,
p < 0.01. Across both conditions, participants on average made
ratings at least one rating per each 6.1 s, suggesting that they were
engaged in both tasks.
NEUROIMAGING DATA
Manipulation checks: neural bases of emotion rating vs. eye-gaze
rating
We first explored neural activity distinctly engaged when per-
ceivers explicitly attended to targets’ internal states (emotion
rating) and when they attended to lower-level features of target
behavior (eye-gaze rating). As predicted, emotion rating—when
compared to the eye-gaze monitoring—engaged brain regions
classically associated with drawing inferences aboutmental states,
including large clusters in MPFC, PCC, and precuneus (see
Figure 1 and Table 1), as well as a number of clusters in left
ventral and dorsal prefrontal cortex potentially related to the
cognitive components necessary to making high-level emotional
appraisals (Mitchell, 2009).
The opposite comparison revealed that monitoring and rating
targets’ eye-gaze, as opposed to their emotional states, recruited
a network of brain regions involved in monitoring motor inten-
tions, somatosensory states, and biological motion, including
bilateral pre-motor cortex, pre- and post-central gyrus, superior
temporal sulcus, and SII, as well as bilateral inferotemporal cortex
extending into the fusiform gyrus (see Figure 1 and Table 1).
Expressivity during emotion rating
When perceivers were tasked with explicitly rating affective states,
both targets’ trait and video-by-video expressive behaviors were
associated with increasing activity brain regions involved in
FIGURE 1 | Clusters more engaged during emotion rating than during
eye-gaze rating (in orange); clusters more engaged during eye-gaze
rating than during emotion rating (in blue). STS, superior temporal sulcus;
FFA, fusiform face area; MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; PCC, posterior
cingulate cortex. All clusters exceed a significance thresholded of p < 0.005,
uncorrected, with an extent threshold of at least 30 voxels, corresponding
with a threshold of p < 0.05, corrected as computed using Monte Carlo
simulations.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 228 | 4
Zaki et al. Task dependent effects of target expressivity
Table 1 | Main effects of condition.
Region Coordinates T-score Volume (vox)
x y z
EMOTION RATING > EYE-GAZE MONITORING
ACC/MPFC −2 24 42 6.2 1255
ACC/MPFC −6 18 12 5.25 485
MPFC −8 42 28 4.24 148
Middle Frontal Gyrus −26 44 34 3.94 147
Middle Frontal Gyrus −46 8 46 4.63 80
Middle Frontal Gyrus −34 26 46 4.14 122
Inferior Frontal Gyrus −46 40 −6 5.57 64
Inferior Frontal Gyrus −44 24 −6 4.18 72
Dorsolateral Prefrontal
Cortex
−46 26 26 4.48 45
Frontal Operculum −56 14 10 5.18 232
Caudate 12 8 10 4.1 58
Precuneus/PCC 0 −22 40 4.85 161
Precuneus/PCC −2 −64 40 3.66 175
Fusiform Gyrus 24 −76 −10 3.83 197
Striate Visual Cortex −16 −70 −10 5.47 355
Cuneus 2 −84 22 3.9 116
EYE-GAZE MONITORING > EMOTION RATING
Premotor Cortex −26 −6 46 6.15 577
Premotor Cortex −58 2 36 3.81 25
Premotor Cortex 54 0 36 5.65 1316
Supplementary Motor Area 8 −4 62 3.37 37
SII 64 −24 24 5.65 363
Superior Parietal Lobe 20 −62 56 5.59 770
Intraparietal Sulcus −32 −42 48 5.48 1219
Fusiform Gyrus/STS 54 −58 −10 5.10 729
Fusiform Gyrus −44 −48 −14 4.67 144
Extrastriate Visual Cortex −42 −80 −6 6.67 661
STS −51 −52 10 4.26 54
Note: Coordinates are in MNI space. ACC, Anterior Cingulate Cortex; MPFC, Medial Prefrontal Cortex; PCC, Posterior Cingulate Cortex; SII, Secondary Sensory
Cortex.
mental state inference, including dorsal and rostral MPFC, PCC,
and lateral temporal cortex (see Figure 2A and Table 2).
Eye-gaze rating
When perceivers were instructed to monitor and rate eye-gaze
direction—a more “low level” feature of target behavior—targets’
trait and state expressivity tracked parametrically with activity
in a set of brain regions involved in monitoring sensorimotor
states and perceiving faces, including pre- and post-central gyri
and left inferotemporal cortex spanning the fusiform gyrus (See
Figure 2B and Table 2).
Direct comparisons across conditions
In order to compare expressivity related activity across eye gaze
and emotion rating conditions, we computed a contrast isolating
brain activity that was more responsive to target trait and state
expressivity in the emotion rating, as compared to eye-gazing
condition, and visa-versa. Broadly, the results of this analysis were
consistent with the single-condition analyses. Critically, MPFC
and several temporal lobe clusters originally identified as tracking
expressivity during emotion rating were also significantly more
responsive to target expressivity during emotion rating, as com-
pared to eye gaze rating, regardless of whether expressivity was
operationalized as a state or trait. The reverse analysis—isolating
brain regions that respond to target expressivity more during
eye-gaze rating than emotion rating—similarly identified regions
found in the single-condition analysis, including the precentral
gyrus and extrastriate visual cortex (Table 3).
That said, this direct contrast did not entirely reproduce the
findings of our single-condition analyses. Specifically, whereas
activity in PCC was found to track expressivity during emotion
rating, but not eye-gaze rating, this region was not significantly
more responsive to expressivity under one condition, as compared
to the other. Similarly, whereas the fusiform gyrus (corresponding
to the so-called “face area”) was responsive to target expressivity
under the eye-gaze rating, but not emotion rating condition, this
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Clusters whose activity tracked with targets’ trait or state expressivity during emotion rating. (B) Clusters whose activity tracked with targets’
trait or state expressivity during eye-gaze rating. FFA, fusiform face area; MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex.
region was not significantly more responsive to target expressiv-
ity under eye-gaze rating, as compared to emotion rating, under
a direct comparison.
Finally, to isolate any regions whose activity commonly tracked
expressivity across both tasks, we computed a conjunction anal-
ysis between both activation maps from our original paramet-
ric analysis (corresponding to expressivity-related activity under
each condition), separately for trait and state expressivity. This
analysis revealed very little common activation across tasks. In
fact, only one cluster survived either conjunction: during both
eye-gaze and emotion-rating, targets’ trait expressivity predicted
activity in the postcentral gyrus (xyz coordinates: −24, −40, 60,
t = 3.52, k = 41 voxels).
DISCUSSION
Perceivers do not employ social cognitive processes in a vacuum.
On the contrary, social cognition is deeply interpersonal, and
social psychologists have long studied the way that people’s traits
and states affect the cognitions, affect, and physiology of their
interaction partners (Snodgrass et al., 1998; Butler et al., 2003).
However, methodological constraints have often prevented neu-
roimaging researchers from studying the way that one person’s
traits or behaviors “get into perceivers’ heads,” and influence cog-
nitive and neural processes they engage (although newer methods
are increasingly circumventing these issues; see, for example
Wilms et al., 2010). Further, little work has examined how the
intensity of social stimuli (including social targets’ expressivity)
interacts with perceivers’ goals to affect information processing.
The current study addressed both of these gaps in knowledge.
Perceivers watching videos of naturally expressive, as opposed
to inexpressive, social targets demonstrated increased engage-
ment of several brain regions, regardless of whether expressivity
was measured as a trait (through self-report questionnaires) or
as a state (through coding of targets’ video-by-video emotional
behavior). However, the patterns of neural activity associated
with target expressivity depended on perceivers’ information
processing goals. If perceivers were actively evaluating targets’
emotions—a task drawing on areas involved in drawing top-
down inferences about internal states, such as the MPFC and
PCC—then expressivity modulated activity in these areas. If,
instead, perceivers were attending to targets’ dynamic shifts in
eye-gaze, then target expressivity correlated with activity in a
wholly separate set of brain regions, including areas associ-
ated with processing faces and biological movement, as well
as cortical regions involved in simulating targets’ sensorimotor
states.
The positive relationship between target expressivity and per-
ceivers’ engagement of key neural associated with social cognition
suggests that more expressive targets somehow “amplify” process-
ing related to decoding others’ internal states. This amplification
could reflect at least two separable effects. First, expressive targets
could produce clearer (i.e., more “readable”) social and affective
signal, which in turn allow perceivers to mentalize more effec-
tively. Second, expressive targets may produce the types of salient
signals (e.g., intense facial expressions) that spontaneously draw
perceivers’ attention, and thus cause those perceivers to engage
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Table 2 | Modulation of brain activity by target expressivity.
Region Coordinates T-score Volume (vox)
x y z
DURING EMOTION RATING (TRAIT EXPRESSIVITY)
MPFC 0 60 28 4.34 560
MPFC −10 38 62 4.91 118
PCC/Precuneus −4 −59 28 4.41 179
Superior Frontal Gyrus −38 10 44 4.12 94
Middle Temporal Gyrus 68 −24 −18 4.82 177
Middle Temporal Gyrus −60 −34 −22 3.59 106
DURING EMOTION RATING (STATE EXPRESSIVITY)
MPFC 18 57 28 4.73 541
MPFC 4 50 0 4.58 48
MPFC/ACC 2 36 42 4.13 31
PCC −2 −32 40 4.14 296
Inferior Temporal Gyrus 54 −30 −26 4.57 141
Posterior Parietal Lobe −48 −62 38 4.41 74
Posterior Parietal Lobe 34 −78 52 4.28 67
Superior Frontal Gyrus 42 16 44 5.54 217
Precentral Gyrus −42 −18 36 5.31 106
Inferior Temporal Gyrus −70 −24 −18 4.78 60
DURING EYE-GAZE RATING (TRAIT EXPRESSIVITY)
Premotor Cortex 18 −8 72 4.02 81
Precentral Gyrus −19 −28 68 4.95 302
Precentral Gyrus −36 −20 36 4.70 31
Fusiform Gyrus −49 −42 −22 4.98 50
Middle Frontal Gyrus 50 30 32 4.99 57
Extrastriate Visual Cortex −14 −82 30 3.68 71
Posterior Occipital Lobe −24 −100 −10 4.34 103
Angular Gyrus −52 −68 44 4.08 50
DURING EYE-GAZE RATING (STATE EXPRESSIVITY)
Premotor Cortex 20 6 64 4.07 59
Precentral Gyrus 18 −8 72 3.83 45
Pre/Postcentral Gyrus −20 −32 78 4.30 160
Fusiform Gyrus −52 −40 −24 3.84 55
Inferior Frontal Gyrus −24 20 −32 3.90 43
Caudate −14 0 −8 4.08 32
Posterior Parietal Lobe −50 −60 42 3.72 31
Note: Coordinates are in MNI space. ACC, Anterior Cingulate Cortex; MPFC, Medial Prefrontal Cortex; PCC, Posterior Cingulate Cortex.
more deeply in subsequent mentalizing and processing of senso-
rimotor social cues. Further research should examine the extent
to which expressivity-driven amplification reflects each or both
of these effects.
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Expressivity as a window into social cognitive “processing
streams”
Perhaps the most striking finding of the current study is that
perceivers’ task set strongly determined the neural correlates
of target expressivity, and that expressivity effects recapitulated
the main effect differences between top-down and bottom-up
social information processing. When perceivers attended to tar-
gets’ affect they preferentially drew on brain regions involved
in drawing explicit inferences about targets, whereas attention
to target eye gaze engaged regions involved in more auto-
matically processing faces, biological motion, and sensorimotor
cues.
Critically, this dissociation was broadly paralleled by the effects
of target expressivity, which drove activity in regions associated
with explicit mental state attribution or bottom up process-
ing of social stimuli when perceivers attended to targets’ emo-
tions or eye gaze, respectively. A direct comparison across tasks
revealed that activity in some of these key regions was signif-
icantly more related to target expressivity under bottom-up or
top-down social cognitive processing goals. MPFC and several
lateral temporal regions were more strongly engaged by target
expressivity during emotion rating, as compared to eye gaze
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Table 3 | Direct comparisons of expressivity related effects across conditions.
Region Coordinates T-score Volume (vox)
x y z
EMOTION RATING > EYE GAZE RATING (TRAIT EXPRESSIVITY)
MPFC −2 60 30 4.43 409
MPFC 0 36 48 3.49 39
Superior Frontal Gyrus −40 18 46 3.91 139
Superior Temporal Gyrus −60 −38 16 4.71 118
MTG/ATL −62 −14 −16 4.06 154
Precentral/Postcentral Gyri 48 −16 36 4.38 62
EMOTION RATING > EYE GAZE RATING (STATE EXPRESSIVITY)
MPFC −6 58 30 4.23 229
Middle Frontal Gyrus −42 10 44 4.8 171
Anterior Temporal Lobe 58 0 −36 4 41
Middle Temporal Gyrus 52 −4 −12 3.74 44
Inferior Temporal Gyrus −52 −24 −26 3.89 75
Precentral Gyrus 44 −18 36 3.86 55
EYE GAZE RATING > EMOTION RATING (TRAIT EXPRESSIVITY)
Precentral Gyrus 28 −22 64 6.17 36
Ventral Striatum 4 2 −2 4.56 117
Fusiform Gyrus 36 −78 −2 3.8 30
DURING EYE-GAZE RATING (STATE EXPRESSIVITY)
Cerebellum −2 −54 −42 4.78 148
Fusiform Gyrus 36 −76 2 4.6 123
Medial Occipital Lobe 16 −88 26 3.65 37
Note: Coordinates are in MNI space. MPFC, Medial Prefrontal Cortex; MTG, Middle Temporal Gyrus; ATL, Anterior Temporal Lobe.
rating, whereas the precentral gyrus and extrastriate visual cortex
demonstrated the opposite pattern. Other regions—such as the
PCC and fusiform gyrus (adjacent to the so-called “face area”)
tracked expressivity in only one of these conditions, but did not
significantly differentiate between conditions. These regions may
be somewhat engaged across both conditions, but fail to meet
a significance threshold under one condition. Consistent with
this idea, a conjunction analysis revealed that almost no clusters
of brain activity significantly tracked target expressivity across
both conditions. Together, these data suggest that the effects
of target expressivity on perceivers’ brain activity strongly—
but not entirely—depends on perceivers’ information processing
goals.
This finding lends converging support to the idea of separable
social cognitive “processing streams” (Zaki and Ochsner, 2012;
Zaki, under revision). The first, centered in midline and lateral
temporal cortex, is likely involved in perceivers’ ability to simu-
late targets’ experiences (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Spreng et al.,
2009), and likely requires perceivers to explicitly attend to tar-
gets (de Lange et al., 2008; Spunt and Lieberman, in press). The
second, distributed among regions involved in processing low-
level social visual cues (e.g., faces and biological movement) and
engaging somatosensory states expressed by targets, is engaged in
a task-independent fashion (Chong et al., 2008), and deployed
whenever the environment contains relevant social cues (Spunt
and Lieberman, in press). In fact, this second processing stream is
sometimes most engaged when perceivers do not explicitly attend
to targets’ internal states (Lieberman et al., 2007). The dissocia-
tion between these social cognitive processing streams has now
been established across a number of studies (Brass et al., 2007;
Gobbini et al., 2007; Wheatley et al., 2007; Spunt and Lieberman,
in press), andmeta-analyses (VanOverwalle, 2009; VanOverwalle
and Baetens, 2009). Here, we extend this finding by demon-
strating that not only are top down and bottom up processing
streams dissociable, but that identical variance in the intensity
of social cues (here instantiated through target expressivity) will
affect one of these processing stream or the other, indepen-
dently, as a function of perceivers’ current goals and cognitive
resources.
The relationship between target expressivity and perceiver
goals in predicting brain activity further bolsters an “interac-
tionist” (Mischel and Shoda, 1995) model of social cognition
as a fundamentally interpersonal phenomenon: depending on
the states and traits of not one person, but of both targets and
perceivers. This framework has been used to fruitfully capture
variance in social judgments and behaviors (Snodgrass et al.,
1998; Zayas et al., 2002; Zaki et al., 2008, 2009; Zaki and Ochsner,
2011). Here we extend this approach to modeling brain activ-
ity. Importantly, the paradigm used here was not “interactive,”
in that it did not include online interactions between—or record
brain activity from—both targets and perceivers (Schilbach et al.,
2006, 2011; Schippers and Keysers, 2011). However, interactionist
models of social cognition like the one supported here dove-
tail nicely with interactive paradigms to support more holistic
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 228 | 8
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models of social cognition and interaction (Zaki and Ochsner,
2009; Schilbach et al., 2012).
Stimulus intensity and naturalistic social cues
Although prior work has almost never focused on the neural bases
of processing information about expressive vs. inexpressive social
targets, a few prior studies have examined the effects of affec-
tive stimulus intensity on brain activity, in the domains of odor
(Small et al., 2003), words (Cunningham et al., 2007), and faces
(Winston et al., 2003). In all of these cases, stimulus intensity
predicted amygdala activity, whereas in the current study it did
not. One possibility is that our design—which employed a rela-
tively small number of stimuli and a parametric analysis—may
have been underpowered to detect effects in the amygdala. A sec-
ond possibility is that a lack of amygdala activity in our task
could reflect differences between the types of cues employed in
previous studies of emotion perception and more “naturalistic”
cues produced by real social targets (Zaki and Ochsner, 2009).
Even during the most intense emotional experiences (e.g., after
winning an Olympic gold medal) targets typically produce com-
plex, nuanced facial expressions that differ fundamentally from
the posed, canonical displays often used in research (Russell et al.,
2003). Thus, while the amygdala is clearly important to forming
fast and computationally efficient evaluations of many affective
stimuli, its role in reacting to and interpreting the more subtle
cues produced by social targets in many other situations may be
more limited.
More broadly, our data connect with the literature on process-
ing affective cues under different levels of attention. Specifically,
prior work has demonstrated that affective stimuli engage sev-
eral neural structures—including the amygdala and sensorimotor
cortex—when perceivers do not attend to target affect (Spunt
and Lieberman, 2012; Whalen et al., 1998; Winston et al., 2003),
attend to low-level target features including eye gaze (Adams and
Franklin, 2009), or draw inferences about targets based on non-
verbal cues (Kuzmanovic et al., 2011). Although researchers have
debated the extent to which neural responses to affective cues are
truly automatic (Pessoa et al., 2002; Pessoa, 2005), the modula-
tion of affect-related neural processing by, for instance, top down
vs. bottom up processing goals is rapidly becoming an estab-
lished feature of the neuroscientific literature. Here, we extend
this insight to demonstrate that naturally occurring variance in
target expressivity modulates neural activity in a manner broadly
consistent with such task dependency.
Target expressivity as a buffer against social cognitive dysfunction
One especially interesting application of the current approach
surrounds illnesses that involve social cognitive and behavioral
dysfunctions. Such difficulties characterize a raft of psychiatric
disorders, such as schizophrenia, borderline personality disor-
der, and social phobia. In almost all cases, social deficits in
these conditions are studied using standardized social stimuli and
paradigms. However, social deficits in these conditions could crit-
ically depend not only on the cognitive or affective characteristics
of affected perceivers, but also on the dispositions and behav-
iors of the targets they encounter. Consider a condition heavily
associated with social cognitive dysfunction: Autism Spectrum
Disorders (ASD). Individuals with ASD perform poorly on social
cognitive tasks such as mental state inference (Roeyers et al.,
2001), a deficit that has been tied to attenuated activation of sev-
eral brain regions including the MPFC and FFA (Schultz et al.,
2000, 2003; Wang et al., 2007). However, perceivers with ASD
perform as well as control participants at a social inference task
when social cues are presented in a clear and structured manner
(Ponnet et al., 2007). One intriguing possibility is that expressive
targets may provide exactly these types of clear social cues, and
perceivers with ASD may demonstrate more normative behavior
and patterns of brain activity when observing expressive targets
(Zaki andOchsner, 2011). Such a finding would have implications
for potential intervention approaches focused on teaching care-
takers and peers of individuals with ASD to structure their social
cues in a manner that drives social cognitive processing and per-
formance in those individuals. Such an approach has the potential
to expand ASD interventions to encompass both perceivers’ and
targets’ roles in producing accurate and adaptive social cognition.
CONCLUSIONS
The current study demonstrates that the neural bases of social
inference are modulated by interpersonal factors. Social targets’
trait expressivity affected perceivers’ deployment of social cogni-
tive processing, but in ways that depended on the task perceivers
were performing. These data provide an early step toward using
neuroimaging to unpack the processes involved in fundamentally
interpersonal social cognition.
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